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‘They blew up the best portion of our city and … it is their duty to replace it’: 
compensation and reconstruction in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising1 
In his vivid account of Easter Week 1916, The Insurrection in Dublin, the writer James 
Stephens observed: ‘The finest part of our city has been blown to smithereens, and burned 
into ashes. Soldiers amongst us who have served abroad say that the ruin of this quarter is 
more complete than anything they have seen at Ypres, than anything they have seen 
anywhere in France or Flanders.’2 In a letter to his sister, Henry Beater, company secretary 
of Arnotts, also likened the smouldering ruins of Sackville Street3 and the adjoining 
thoroughfares to a scene from the war:  
House after house destroyed utterly. Clery & Co., D.B.C., Eason, G.P.O., Metropole and Imperial Hotels, 
Freeman’s Journal and literally dozens of other establishments in ruins. Henry St. on both sides from the 
pillar to Arnott & Co. nearly every house down and absolutely ruined.
4
  
Miraculously, Arnotts, virtually alone among the businesses of the street, suffered little 
damage and was able to reopen within days. As the sense of shock and bewilderment at the 
insurrection subsided, attention swung to the pressing issue of restitution. Denouncing the 
Rising as ‘criminal madness’, the Irish Independent, the most widely read national daily with 
a circulation of about 100,000, made clear in its first editorial after the outbreak the ‘duty of 
the government to indemnify the sufferers most, if not all, of whom had not the slightest 
tinge of sympathy with the “rising”.5 A consensus swiftly emerged among the business 
community, in the shape of the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association; the press 
(irrespective of political hue); and Dublin’s public representatives that the state had failed to 
protect the community, despite numerous warnings of a possible outbreak, and therefore 
the Imperial Treasury should make good the loss to private citizens of ‘those rights in life 
and property that the Government exists to protect’.6 The laxity of the Dublin Castle 
administration was underscored by the Royal Commission on the Rebellion. Its investigation 
of the causes of the Rising, extensively reported in the Irish press in late May, heaped 
discredit on the Irish administration and on Augustine Birrell, Irish chief secretary since 
1907, in particular.7 Feeling ‘smashed to pieces’ he accepted political responsibility and 
resigned.8 So too did his energetic under-secretary, Matthew Nathan. The British 
government recognized that the exchequer would have to pay a considerable sum for the 
destruction, caused in large measure by artillery fire, and, accordingly, H. H. Asquith, the 
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prime minister, offered assurances to this end in the House of Commons on 10 May.9 Until 
he was dislodged as prime minister in December 1916, Asquith’s commitment to this pledge 
was unwavering. 
The present article offers a new perspective on the aftermath of Easter 1916 by 
exploring the related issues of compensation and reconstruction. This aspect of the Rising 
has not received sufficient historical attention and has, understandably, been 
overshadowed by, among other issues, the renewed efforts to resolve the Irish question in 
the summer of 1916, the course of the First World War, the fate of Roger Casement and the 
treatment of Irish internees in Britain.10 But the compensation question should not be 
divorced from the grander political context. The speed with which the British government 
admitted liability and undertook to provide funds for the reconstruction of buildings and the 
replacement of contents suggests ‘a supreme desire’, as Asquith put it to John Dillon, who 
passionately denounced the executions in Dublin and praised the bravery of the insurgents  
on 11 May, ‘not to embitter, but to allay, the feeling.’11 The cabinet was acutely aware of 
the corrosive effect on Irish public opinion of secret courts martial, early morning 
executions, mass arrests and deportations, the imposition of martial law and lurid 
allegations of military ill-discipline. In this light a generous measure of compensation was a 
means of conciliating the Dublin business community, citizens, and municipality. It was a 
harbinger of the fresh but ultimately ill-fated attempt to bring about a home rule settlement 
when, after a cabinet meeting on 21 May, Lloyd George was tasked with mediating between 
the I.P.P and Unionists. Given Britain’s increasing anxiety for the U.S. to join the war, a 
demonstration of statesmanship in Ireland offered the prospect of placating American 
public opinion.  The commitment to provide compensation may have been an Asquithian 
strategy to regain the damaged trust of the I.P.P. prior to negotiations about home rule. 
Redmond and his beleaguered party had little to show for their efforts since the outbreak of 
the war beyond an inoperative home rule measure on the statute book. Having refused a 
place in Asquith’s wartime coalition in May 1915, Redmond was shorn of any political 
influence but nevertheless had to endure affronts from the War Office and mounting 
criticism at home for government policy not of his making. The twin issues of compensation 
and reconstruction presented an opportunity to recover waning prestige. They were a 
godsend to the Dublin M.P.s – John Joseph Clancy, William Field, Patrick J. Brady, William 
Cotton, John D. Nugent and Alfred Byrne – who could practice some old fashioned 
clientelism by delivering tangible political demands for constituents and providing an 
interface between the government, the Dublin business community and Dublin Corporation.  
Little time was lost.  In a letter to the prime minister on 9 May they stated that ‘the feeling 
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in Dublin amongst all classes is that the compensation should come out of Imperial funds.’12 
The following day a deputation was received by Asquith on the issue of rebuilding.13 
Intriguingly, the details of the compensation scheme were being worked out in early June 
just as the home rule proposals were formulated and conveyed to Carson and Redmond. As 
in 1914, the sticking point remained partition.14  The Freeman’s Journal, the organ of the 
I.P.P, appeared to conflate the local matter of restitution with the national question:  
An immediate and generous settlement is certainly demanded, not merely in the interests of the 
immediate sufferers, and of the city, but for the sake of the larger interests dependent upon a general 
pacification. Delay here means not only the multiplication of losses but the fostering of discontent and 
bad feeling and there is [sic] enough of these commodities about without any further additions.
15
 
Redmond mortgaged his political reputation by forcing through acceptance of the 
temporary exclusion of six counties only to learn humiliatingly on 22 July that the 
government favoured permanent exclusion. For Stephen Gwynn, Nationalist M.P. for 
Galway city, ‘that day really finished the constitutional party and overthrew Redmond’s 
power.’16 But until the home rule negotiations foundered, the I.P.P. could exert its political 
leverage to support vigorously the demands of property owners, or sufferers as they were 
called, and Dublin Corporation. Their overriding priority was a prompt restoration of the 
devastated area. The thorny issues of the scale of compensation and admission criteria, as 
well as conditions pertaining to rebuilding, proved far from straightforward. They were the 
subject of intense, and at times contentious, discussions between property owners, Dublin 
Corporation, the I.P.P. and the government between May and December 1916.  
I 
Contemporary observers and photographers captured the scale of the damage to the city 
centre caused by the Rising.17 The actual physical damage, though extensive, was 
predominantly confined to the Sackville Street area, where many of the buildings were old 
and highly flammable. The Dublin Fire Brigade responded to ninety-three fires during Easter 
Week.18 The first fire calls from Sackville Street were received on the night of Easter 
Monday. The Cable Shoe Company and the True Form Shoe shop had been looted and set 
alight. Both fires were extinguished. Blazes in North Earl Street on Tuesday and Henry Street 
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on Wednesday, again ascribed to looters, were also successfully contained.19 As the 
intensity of the fighting in Sackville Street increased with the commencement of military 
operations against insurgent positions on Wednesday, the fire brigade was unable to attend 
fires there on grounds of safety.20  At about 12.30 p.m. on Thursday 27 April a serious fire at 
the Irish Times reserve printing works in Abbey Street, which spread across the street to 
Wynn’s Hotel, led to a conflagration that consumed the block bound by Eden Quay, Sackville 
Street and Abbey Street as far as Marlborough Street.21 By Friday, on the west side of 
Sackville Street, the G.P.O., Eason’s, the newly opened Coliseum Theatre, Hotel Metropole 
and the Freeman’s Journal offices were ablaze. To Louisa Norway, wife of the head of the 
Irish Post Office, ‘it seemed as if the whole city was on fire, the glow extending right across 
the heavens, and the red glare hundreds of feet high’.22 Sniper fire prevented fire crews 
from tackling the fires in Sackville Street on Saturday, despite the ceasefire order, but the 
entire brigade turned out that evening when Jervis Street Hospital was threatened by fire.23 
The loss of buildings of historical and architectural significance was quite small, given the 
proximity of Trinity College, the Bank of Ireland and the Custom House. After the G.P.O. the 
next most important was the Royal Hibernian Academy on Lower Abbey Street. Joseph 
Kavanagh, resident keeper, estimated the value of material destroyed at £40,000. This 
included the collection of casts and portraits along with the pictures assembled for the 
annual exhibition.24 Captain Thomas Purcell, chief of the Dublin Fire Brigade, estimated very 
accurately that £2,500,000 worth of damage had been caused to over 200 buildings and 
stock.25  
II 
Despite the pressures of the war campaign during 1916 and myriad domestic difficulties, 
Asquith played a principal role in meeting concerns about compensation and reconstruction 
in Dublin. He visited Ireland between 12 and 18 May to ascertain the state of affairs for 
himself and spent time in Dublin, Belfast and Cork. Notably, Asquith’s first action on arrival 
was to drive through Sackville Street to witness the destruction. This elicited comment from 
all the Dublin daily newspapers.26 The Daily Express, for example, maintained  
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the Government must help the victims. It is bound to do so in policy and in honour. Mr Asquith is on the 
spot. He has seen for himself the extent and magnitude of the devastation. He must surely realize that 
generosity and promptitude are the essence of the remedy that must be applied.27 
While in Ireland, Asquith consulted frequently with Sir Robert Chalmers, who served as 
under-secretary from May until September 1916.28 As joint permanent secretary to the 
Treasury with a reputation for ‘tough efficiency’, Chalmers was well qualified to tackle the 
problematic issue of compensation, despite the insinuation by Henry Robinson, vice-
president of the local government board, that his one idea ‘appeared to be to get back to 
London as soon as ever he could.’29  
The acting under-secretary gave the compensation question his immediate attention 
on reaching Dublin on 8 May. Chalmers outlined his thinking in an astute letter to the prime 
minister. First, he was in little doubt that the government would have to pay for the damage 
to buildings occasioned by the military and, in particular, by the use of artillery. Second, 
investigations requiring some form of committee would be necessary to settle the complex 
issue of compensation for contents. Third, Chalmers insisted that any government action 
should be ex gratia and that no claims for consequential losses, such as loss of profits or 
customers, should be entertained.30 This remained the general approach of the 
government. An important initial consideration was the prospect of claims for personal 
injury or loss of life sustained by civilians. However, Chalmers was adamant that such claims 
be excluded because of the difficulty of discriminating between the innocent and those who 
were complicit in the rebellion.31 His contention that the government should only assume 
liability in the case of destroyed buildings and their contents was approved by the prime 
minister on 8 June.32 In September, however, the government performed a volte-face by 
accepting in principle that compensation ought to be awarded for loss of life and injury; a 
Rebellion Victims’ Committee was appointed the following month.33 On 11 May Asquith told 
the House of Commons that the Castle government had broken down and that agreement 
on home rule should be sought. For this reason no chief secretary was appointed and his 
parliamentary duties devolved on Herbert Samuel, the home secretary. There was close 
collaboration between Chalmers, Asquith, Maurice Bonham Carter, the prime minister’s 
private secretary, and Samuel until mid-June when the full details of the compensation 
scheme were unveiled. Only when it became clear on 22 July that the home rule 
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negotiations had collapsed was the office of chief secretary filled with the appointment of 
Henry Duke, a Conservative M.P., on 31 July.34 Like the prime minister, he too proved 
broadly sympathetic on the issue of compensation. 
III 
On 8 May a well-attended meeting of traders and property owners who suffered loss by the 
destruction of their premises and effects was held in the Mansion House. William Martin 
Murphy, one of the most prominent businessmen of his day, whose interests in Clery’s 
department store, the Imperial Hotel and Dublin United Tram Company were all significantly 
affected by the insurrection, was in the chair. As a practical measure he proposed that those 
present should form themselves into an association and appoint a committee to deal with 
insurance companies and the government.35 Thus the Dublin Fire and Property Losses 
Association (1916) came into being. Murphy proved a highly effective chairman of the 
committee which was composed of leading businessmen, both unionist and nationalist, who 
had suffered loss.36 Robert J. Kidney, an incorporated accountant and auditor, was elected 
secretary and offered his offices in the Star Buildings, 12-14 College Green to the 
association. Following the inaugural meeting, a telegram was sent to Asquith and copied to 
Lord Wimborne, the lord lieutenant; Chalmers and all Irish M.P.s requesting the prime 
minister to receive a deputation to lay its claims for compensation before the government.  
 The commercial imperatives of compensation and reconstruction transcended 
political divisions, whether intra-nationalist or nationalist-unionist, and the association 
displayed a remarkable unity and singularity of purpose.  Indeed the inaugural meeting was 
praised by the unionist Daily Express for its ‘commendable disregard of everything except 
the business under immediate consideration.’37 The association enjoyed substantial support 
from the press, irrespective of political stance. As might be expected, the Irish Independent, 
of which Murphy was proprietor, devoted several editorials to the rebuilding of Dublin and 
ardently re-echoed the demands of the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association. 
Politically, Murphy, and by implication his newspaper, although nationalist, was an enemy 
of the I.P.P. He had bitterly opposed the financial clauses of the third home rule bill in 1914 
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and throughout June 1916 trenchantly disparaged Lloyd George’s partition scheme as a 
‘hateful and pernicious policy.’38 Yet within the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association 
he had no difficulty working with Patrick White, the Irish Party M.P. for North Meath who 
owned 22 and 23 Henry Street; and Lorcan Sherlock, the I.P.P. stalwart (though never an 
M.P.), former lord mayor and prominent businessman.  Indeed Murphy was generous in his 
praise of the efforts of the Dublin M.P.s in pressing Asquith and Chalmers on the matter of 
rebuilding.39 Although the Irish Independent and the Freeman’s Journal waged war on one 
another throughout June over the home rule proposals, there was accord on the end 
martial law and the compensation question. Given the complete destruction of its premises 
on Princes Street, this was a particularly urgent matter for the Freeman’s Journal; it was 
ultimately awarded £38,997 compensation.40 
The Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association set about its work promptly and the 
committee met on a daily basis. To fund its endeavours, a levy was imposed of one-eighth of 
a penny per pound in the amount of the compensation claim with a minimum of 10s. and a 
maximum subscription of £50.41 Three days after the inaugural meeting, a notice in all the 
daily papers requested those who had not already sent their claims to Kidney to do so under 
three headings: total amount of the claim, proportion insured under ordinary fire insurance 
policies, and the portion claimed for looting. Assistants and other employees were 
requested to supply details of their personal loss through their employers.42 On 19 May 
Kidney reported that the claims received from the circa 1,500 members of the association 
amounted to £2,500,000.43  
In the first of many consultations with Dublin Castle, a deputation from the 
association met Chalmers on 10 and 11 May. After a lengthy conference, agreement was 
reached on three significant procedural principles. First, all claims would be dealt with on 
the basis of the insurance policies in force for ordinary risk at the time of the destruction. 
Second, for settlement purposes looting, rampant during the Rising as the Dublin 
Metropolitan Police had been withdrawn from the streets, was deemed the same as 
burning. Thirdly, a tribunal would be established by the government to adjudicate on other 
claims made by insured persons as well as by those who were uninsured.44 The latter would 
be treated on the basis of analogy with insured claims.45 Asquith approved the proposals 
and directed that they be announced quickly but explicitly requested that no committee 
personnel be named.46  
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For the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association this was but the first stage in the 
complex process of ensuring an equitable settlement of what it regarded as just claims. 
Hence its disappointment at a communication from Chalmers on 16 May, endorsed by 
Asquith, informing them that while the government would meet the claims it would 
‘assume, as the maximum of its ex gratia grant, the same liability as would have fallen on 
the insurance companies if the risk had been covered by the policies in force at the time of 
the recent disturbances’. Consequential loss would not be considered.47 The letter was 
brought before a meeting of the association on 19 May. While welcoming the swift official 
response, two key criticisms of the proposed scheme were raised. The first was that claims 
for consequential losses of an immediate character should not be ruled out of 
consideration. The second concern stemmed from the undertaking that uninsured traders 
would be compensated fully. To members of the association this suggested that the 
uninsured would be placed in a better position than the partially insured because the 
amount of an underinsured person’s policy would be the maximum of his compensation 
allowance.  The association and the press maintained that the three classes – the insured, 
the partially insured and the uninsured – should be treated equally. Concerns over 
consequential losses and the position of the partially insured were the subject of a 
resolution forwarded to Chalmers on 20 May.48 
The under-secretary was unmoved. In a letter to Bonham Carter he predicted that 
there would be agitation against the compensation committee. Chalmers hoped that 
Asquith would ‘stand firm about consequential damages and will refuse to admit them. Our 
only firm ground is the insurance analogy; all else is quagmire.’ He conceded that the case of 
the uninsured might pose a difficulty but was confident that the number involved was 
relatively insignificant, and that they could be levelled up ‘so far as is prudent without 
inspiring the insured with jealousy and cupidity.’49 The under-secretary also warned the 
prime minister of the likelihood of I.P.P. efforts at Westminster ‘to squeeze a bit more out of 
a paternal government’ and to be consistent with any pledges. Chalmers believed that J.J. 
Clancy M.P. was ‘desperately anxious to pose as the saviour of sufferers and so to 
reintegrate his and his party’s position in the public eye.’50 Bonham Carter reassured the 
under-secretary that Asquith would not give way.51 The Dublin parliamentarians were 
certainly active and raised concerns that ratepayers should not be mulcted in any 
compensation under the malicious injury code to which the government agreed on 20 May 
1916.52 This was given legislative form in the Law and Procedure (Emergency Provisions) 
(Ireland) Act, which amended the law and procedure of civil courts in relation to the 
conditions arising out of the rebellion. Clause 1(6) protected the local authority from claims 
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for compensation for criminal or malicious injuries in respect of injuries to persons or 
property.53 
By the end of May there was widespread indignation at Chalmers’ interpretation of 
the compensation scheme. The Irish Independent considered the exclusion of the partially 
insured as ‘absurd’.54 It urged that the government should not act in a ‘niggardly manner 
but take a broad and generous view of their liability’.55 The Freeman’s Journal deemed it ‘an 
extraordinary principle of differentiation and discrimination’, and likewise demanded an 
equitable approach.56 The situation was exacerbated by official silence regarding the 
composition or precise terms of reference of the proposed government committee. The 
sense of disquiet among members of the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association was 
heightened by the under-secretary’s rejection of its proposal to nominate a member of the 
committee, the suggestion that there would be no appeal mechanism and, in particular, by 
Chalmers’ steadfast refusal to consider the inclusion of consequential loss.57 Although the 
government ‘had banged the door on claims under that head’, the Irish Times argued, 
nonetheless, that ‘the losses so incurred by innocent people ought not to be wholly shut 
out.’ Similar sentiments were expressed by White and Sherlock in a letter to the press on 24 
May.58 This mounting anxiety prompted Kidney to appeal directly to the prime minister.59 
Asquith responded by dispatching Herbert Samuel to Dublin on 2 June.60  He recalled in his 
memoirs that ‘Dublin was a pitiful sight’, the result artillery action and conflagrations.61 The 
visit of the home secretary occasioned great anticipation: ‘Dublin expects that, before he 
leaves, the whole matter of compensation for losses will have been put on a proper footing, 
so that the sufferers will know precisely where they stand.’62  
 A pivotal meeting between the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association and the 
home secretary took place in Dublin Castle on 5 June.  With the exception of William Martin 
Murphy, who was unavoidably absent in London, the committee was present en masse and 
was joined by the Dublin M.P.s. The group was introduced by John Redmond. The home 
secretary was flanked by a strong team comprising his parliamentary secretary, Sir John 
Barran; Chalmers, J. H. Campbell, the attorney general; Henry Robinson and A. P. Magill, the 
former private secretary to Birrell.63 Charles Eason read a lengthy memorandum on behalf 
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of the association which argued for full state compensation for every type of loss to 
buildings and contents suffered by property owners and traders through, and in direct 
consequence, of the destruction of Easter Week. He maintained that ‘it would be 
inequitable to limit the compensation to the amount of the insurance policies’ because the 
policies were not intended to cover the extraordinary events and the consequent damage 
that had taken place.64 In normal circumstances, fire detection and sprinkler systems would 
limit a fire and the fire service would be able to operate. The military operations prevented 
this.  He also drew attention to the increase in the price of labour and building materials, 
something exacerbated by the war.  This was a significant consideration, as between 1910 
and 1920 the cost of bricks and Welsh slates per thousand jumped from £1 12s. to £7 and 
£9 10s. to £48 respectively. Similarly, the summer hourly rate for bricklayers increased from 
8½d. to 2s. 2d. and for slaters from 8½d. to 2s. 1½d.65 The memorandum then moved from 
the insurance value of destroyed buildings and stocks to other categories of loss such as 
standing charges, rents, book debts that were irrecoverable due to the burning of account 
books, and dwindling profits due to disruption to business. Damage due to fire was not the 
only category specified by the association. Eason highlighted the value of goods looted or 
damaged by water, as well as the damage to buildings and their contents due to gunfire, 
water and causes other than conflagration. He stressed the necessity, whatever the method 
of investigation of claims adopted, of advancing sums promptly to claimants who were 
unable to resume business without funds and ‘to avert the misery and distress’ of traders 
‘being deprived for some time of their means of livelihood.’66 The association’s statement 
was published in the press on 10 June. To it may be added one further point. Despite the 
callous reputation acquired during the 1913 lockout, Murphy suggested to Chalmers that ‘it 
would be a great charity’ if employees and assistants could be compensated speedily for the 
loss of clothing and other belongings.67 The under-secretary, who in his younger days had 
worked to alleviate the poor and the sick in East London, promised to consider ‘what is 
practicable for the humbler people’ mentioned.68 
 Samuel’s response was politically astute but not particularly reassuring. He remarked 
that it was a distinct advantage for the government to have an organized body representing 
the sufferers and commended the cogent case put forward. But the home secretary was 
quick to emphasize that in contrast to the position of many people in the UK, who suffered 
losses due to the war, the prime minister had exceptionally placed on the exchequer the 
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charge for the sufferers in Dublin. He directly addressed the issue of those partially insured 
– a key demand of the association – by stating categorically that it would ‘not be equitable’ 
if they ‘were to be treated worse than the uninsured.’69 Samuel stressed both his and 
Chalmers’ anxiety that the machinery for dealing with and assessing cases be set to work 
without further delay, and that the government was animated by a ‘sympathetic spirit’.70  
However, that did not extend to consequential losses on which the home secretary, when 
pressed by Patrick White M.P., refused to ‘open that very wide door’.71 Increased building 
costs were likewise dismissed. Samuel’s response to the association was greeted with 
disappointment when published in the press on 14 June. The Daily Express maintained that 
‘when the State, for its own safety and welfare, destroyed their [owners’] property, surely 
they were entitled, as a matter of common justice, to be compensated for the loss they had 
suffered … at the hands of servants of the State.’72  
IV 
In mid-June 1916, Chalmers announced the appointment of a three-man committee 
composed of one Irish businessman and two men of wide insurance experience in 
connection with the destruction of buildings and their contents in Dublin and elsewhere.73 
Revealingly, the original name of this body – Destroyed Property Committee – was altered 
to the less contentious Property Losses (Ireland) Committee 1916. The chairman, Sir William 
Goulding, chairman of the fertilizer and phosphates firm, W. & H. M. Goulding and the Great 
Southern and Western Railway, wisely insisted on this. He was joined by two veteran fire 
assessors: William E. Osborn of Messrs Selfe & Co. London and Samuel Pipkin, general 
manager of the Atlas Assurance Company Ltd., London.74 James J. Healy of the Office of 
Public Works acted as secretary of the committee which was based at 51 St Stephen’s Green 
East. The committee was charged with three responsibilities. First, to ascertain the sums 
covered for ordinary fire risks by insurance policies in force at the time of the destruction. 
Secondly, to advise what part of such sums would have been paid by insurance companies if 
the destruction had been caused by accidental fire. Thirdly, it was to recommend how the 
various claims of uninsured persons could fairly be dealt with and, in a significant concession 
to the Dublin Fire and Loss Association, to what extent exceptional treatment should be 
allowed for insured persons in view of the unique circumstances of Easter Week.75 The 
committee was impressively efficient. It met for less than ten months and its report, agreed 
on 7 April 1917, was submitted to the government the following month.  
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At the committee’s first meeting on 21 June 1916 the form of procedure was laid 
down. To simplify matters looting was deemed to be burning but no consequential damage 
was to be taken into account. This effectively ruled out all claims for loss of profits, standing 
charges and book debts, none of which were provided for under ordinary fire policies.76 A 
claim form was settled on, which included, as might be expected, a statutory declaration of 
its veracity, thereby enabling the government to prosecute if fraudulent claims were 
discovered. Larger and more substantial claims, such as those for rebuilding, were to be 
investigated by qualified fire assessors. The practice adopted by insurance companies in 
dealing with claims arising under their fire policies was to be followed and the assessment 
was to represent the value of the damage at the date of destruction. Three Irish firms of 
assessors were appointed to deal with claims in excess of £100: Walter Hume & Co., Dublin; 
William Montgomery & Son, Dublin; and, from July, R. N. Kennedy, Belfast. By the autumn 
ten assessors were employed.77 Smaller claims were scrutinized by insurance inspectors. In 
July, A. M. Brown of the Royal Insurance Company was appointed on a whole time basis, at 
a salary of five guineas per week, to examine such claims.78 Thirteen others worked part 
time. The work was greatly speeded up by the agreement of the Dublin Fire and Property 
Losses Association to transfer all claims that had been lodged with it. Newspaper 
advertisements in the Dublin daily press requested outstanding claims to be submitted 
before the closing date of 12 August.79  
 In what amounted to a vindication of the position of the Dublin Fire and Property 
Losses Association, it quickly became clear to the committee that, despite government 
opposition, to limit the loss admissible in insured cases to the amount of the insurance 
would not meet the special circumstances. The committee’s interpretation was highly 
sympathetic in that it recognized that buildings were allowed to burn out as the fire brigade 
could not intervene, the police were withdrawn, and owners were prevented by the military 
from approaching their burning premises. Consequently, nothing could be done in the 
circumstances to save property from fire or looting. Under the Emergency Provisions Ireland 
Act, property owners and traders were unable to recover compensation for the damage 
sustained from the rate-payers. In effect, the committee argued that this meant that all 
losses merited exceptional treatment. In each case, where loss could be proven, the 
Property Losses Committee recommended payment of the sum which an insurance 
company would have allowed had the loss been fully covered by insurance.80 
 A total of 7,001 claims for £2,791,872 were received by the Property Losses (Ireland) 
Committee.  Of this number, 6,236 applications, just over 89 per cent, were admitted 
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amounting to a total claim of £2,632,522. The committee recommended for payment 
£1,844,390 or 70 per cent of this sum.81 The Dublin business community represented by the 
Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association were not, of course, the only claimants. The 
committee recognized the importance of promptly settling the claims of workmen and 
employees ‘who, owing to the loss of tools or clothing, were in many cases unable to obtain 
work.’82 Some 3,200 small claims for personal effects or minor damage to property had 
been received by the beginning of November 1916.83 These were processed first before the 
more substantial claims which, by definition, were complex and time consuming. In October 
in response to set piece parliamentary questions from Byrne and Clancy alleging delay, 
Henry Duke told the Commons that such allegations were unfounded because 1,195 of the 
1,235 applications had been paid in full.84 The amounts involved were generally modest as 
the following examples illustrate. Alex Harper was awarded £23 1s. 6d. for damage to the 
doors and looting at 14 Fownes Street, while Margaret Kiernan was awarded £1 7s. 5d. for 
the loss of an apron and shoes. 85 There were numerous claims for property destroyed in the 
jewellery stores of Sackville Street.  John Farrell of 62 Upper Sackville Street, who sought 
£20 for his gold watch destroyed in Hopkins and Hopkins, was awarded £12.86 Many visitors 
staying in hotels such as Wynn’s claimed for the loss of personal effects. Several suppliers of 
foodstuffs seized for provisioning purposes by the military were compensated. Daniel 
Murphy Ltd. of Mary Street was allowed £2 2s. for butter and £2 16s. for pork seized at 
Kingsbridge Station.87 The military authorities deemed that premises used to house troops 
should be paid for at billeting rates.88 There were also claims from areas outside Dublin such 
as Enniscorthy and Oranmore. The administrator of the deceased owner of Oranmore RIC 
barracks was awarded £24 12s. for gunfire damage.89 As it was practically impossible no 
distinction was made between gunfire damage caused by insurgents and that caused by the 
military.  Careful consideration was given to loss of rent as a separate category. As rent was 
conventionally treated as a building loss covered by ordinary fire policy, it was admitted only 
if it was insured against and to a maximum of one year.90  
For a variety of reasons, 765 applications totalling £159,350 were declined.91 The 
rejections fell into eleven general categories. Predictably, no grant was made in respect of 
the property of anyone complicit in the outbreak and each list of claimants was subjected to 
police inspection. Yet twenty such claims amounting to £6,368 were received. Four were 
made by Count and Countess Plunkett for the alleged theft by the military of money, 
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jewellery and personal effects as well as damage to property. None were entertained.92 This 
was undoubtedly due to the participation of their three sons in the Rising, all of whom were 
sentenced to death. Only Joseph was executed; George and Jack were interned, and the 
Count and Countess were deported to Oxford for nine months. The committee followed the 
insurance practice of not making awards for the loss of money or securities. There were 
twenty such claims for a total of £242.93  Eighty-two claims amounting to £114,853 were 
deemed consequential losses and rejected. A typical example was Windgap Co-op Dairy 
Society which sought £40 for the loss in sale of a consignment of butter sent by rail to 
Kingsbridge.94 There was no proof of loss in 56 cases which amounted to £10,276; 28 
applications totalling £577 were withdrawn, and 225 cases for a combined amount of 
£8,087 were not proceeded with. Acting on Lord Wimborne’s instructions, claims in respect 
of government property destroyed or damaged were not considered. In this way, the G.P.O., 
the Linen Hall Barracks and four other buildings were excluded. Insurance companies were 
found to be liable in 104 cases, particularly for damage to plate glass, to the tune of £7,598.  
Other parties were liable in 57 cases totalling £1,830. There were 52 claims for firearms and 
field glasses seized by the military but these fell outside the terms of reference and were 
referred to the chief secretary’s office. Lastly, 115 claims were excluded on the grounds that 
they were received too late for consideration.95  
The assessors categorized larger claims. The more urgent were those where 
destroyed stock or plant resulted in the claimants being unable to resume business in the 
absence of a settlement.  To minimize hardship once a preliminary assessors’ report was 
received, the committee recommended a substantial payment on account, pending a full 
valuation of the loss sustained.96 The largest awards were for the 210 cases in which 
property had to be rebuilt. These included 16 properties on Lower Abbey Street, 25 on 
Middle Abbey Street, 1 on Beresford Place, 4 on Bolton Street, 4 on Lower Bridge Street, 1 
on Great Brunswick Street, 1 on Cathedral Street, 2 in Clanwilliam Place, 6 in Cole’s Lane, 1 
in Crane Lane, 2 on Dame Street, 1 on Dean Street, 3 on Earl Place, 11 on North Earl Street, 
13 on Eden Quay, 3 at Harbour Court, 3 on Harcourt Street, 4 on Henry Place, 36 on Henry 
Street, 1 on North King’s Street, 1 on Linen Hall, 2 on Marlborough Street, 10 on Moore 
Street, 1 on Parliament Street, 8 on Prince’s Street, 5 on Sackville Place, 35 on Lower 
Sackville Street, 6 on Upper Sackville Street, 3 on Usher’s Quay and 1 on Yarnhall Street.97 
The largest of these awards was Clery’s which was granted £77,292 for the destruction of 
21-27 Sackville Street.98 
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The law firms in Dublin did exceptionally well from the compensation process as 
many claimants applied through their solicitors. But a group of nine, known as the ‘burnt-
out solicitors’, were less fortunate and suffered the complete destruction of their offices 
along with all legal documentation deposited in their strong rooms. Their position was 
pursued with vigour by J.J. Clancy, himself a barrister and journalist, and the other Dublin 
M.P.s.99 Patrick Rooney, chairman of the burnt-out solicitors and a committee member of 
the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association, made representations in person to Samuel 
in June and the solicitors’ group also appeared before the Property Losses Committee.100 
They were particularly concerned about the expense of replacing destroyed deeds and 
documents as well as the costs of perpetuating testimony where essential deeds were 
destroyed. The intensive lobbying paid dividends. Under the Law & Procedure (Emergency 
Provisions) (Ireland) Act, the solicitors were relieved of liability in respect of deeds or other 
documents lost while in their custody. The act also extended the power of the high court as 
regards perpetuation of testimony to cases in which the title deeds had been lost or 
destroyed. A scale of fees was suggested by the Treasury for the several classes of work 
required with a time limit of one year.101  
The Property Losses Committee did not actually disburse awards. Its purpose was to 
investigate claims and recommend a sum for the Treasury to approve and pay out. A total of 
forty-one compensation schedules were presented to the government between July 1916 
and April 1917. This mechanism gave the impression of delay and disgruntled the Dublin 
business community. In October, William Martin Murphy claimed that no compensation had 
yet been paid on account for rebuilding, giving rise to fears that the government might have 
revised the terms of reference.102 Owners were understandably anxious to ascertain the 
amount of compensation they would receive. Consequential losses were increased by what 
the association deemed unjust and unreasonable delay. A unanimous resolution on 6 
November castigated the ‘dilatory conduct of the government’ and the matter was raised in 
parliament by the Dublin M.P.s and in the press.103 The familiar bogey of the uninsured 
faring better than the partially insured also remained a nagging grievance. A difference of 
opinion regarding this class of claim had emerged between the Irish administration and the 
Treasury, which proposed limiting ex gratia payments to £1,000 irrespective of the 
recommendations of the Property Losses (Ireland) Committee. On 22 November a 
deputation from the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association, introduced by Redmond, 
was received by Asquith and Duke. Following the failure of the Lloyd George scheme in July 
the British government had been consumed by the war and exhibited little interest in Irish 
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self-government. But on the issue of restitution for the destruction of Easter 1916 Asquith 
once again proved both pragmatic and conciliatory.  He recognized the urgency of the 
situation and undertook to communicate with the Treasury and to expedite a settlement by 
every means in his power.104 Two weeks later Asquith was deposed as prime minister. As his 
biographer has noted, he tended to disguise his personal interventions but the subsequent 
stance taken by Duke indicates that Asquith was true to his word.105 The chief secretary 
estimated that equitable treatment of the partially insured would require only an additional 
£300,000. He recognized the political importance of the gesture: ‘any defect in fulfilment of 
a ministerial promise … would defeat the whole object of appeasement for which the 
promise was made, and is easily made the text of vehement popular attacks on the methods 
of British rule in Ireland.’106 The concerns of the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association 
were eased considerably in January 1917 when it became possible for owners to inspect the 
note of awards at the under-secretary’s office.107 Funds for actual expenditure were 
released on a phased basis on the production of a certificate from the architect or builder 
employed in the rebuilding. For example, William McDowell was paid £2,070 in six 
instalments between 23 May and 13 December 1917 for the restoration of 3 Upper Sackville 
Street.108 Each case had to be supported by a recommendation from the commissioner of 
public works.109 The flinty lords of the Treasury were not the only source of delay, however. 
The framing of workable town planning regulations and additional financial provisions, 
embodied in the Dublin Reconstruction (Emergency Provisions) Act, proved arduous, 
contentious and protracted. No reconstruction could begin until the act became law in 
December 1916. 
V 
Early twentieth-century Dublin was beset by a chronic shortage of housing, overcrowded 
tenements, widespread dereliction and traffic congestion. These problems, new approaches 
to urban development in England and Germany, and the likelihood of home rule combined 
to generate increasing interest in town planning. There was, for example, a competition in 
1914 for a development scheme for Dublin promoted by the Civics Institute of Ireland and 
sponsored by the lord lieutenant.110 For Dublin Corporation, therefore, the destruction of 
Easter Week and the promised government compensation presented both hidden dangers 
and welcome opportunities.  James M. Gallagher,111 the lord mayor, and his fellow 
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counsellors were anxious that Sackville Street and adjoining areas would be rebuilt, at a 
minimum, in a manner not worse than before and ideally with greater dignity and ‘in 
consonance with a well devised town planning and street widening scheme.’112 This echoed 
the sentiments of the Royal Institute of the Architects of Ireland, which was eager to achieve 
‘the enhancement of the architectural dignity of the city’.113 While deploring the loss of life, 
R. M. Butler, editor the influential Irish Builder and Engineer and designer of the neo-
classical UCD building on Earlsfort Terrace, suggested that ‘the clearance by fire in Lower 
Sackville Street affords a unique and unexpected opportunity for putting into practice the 
true principles of town planning … to give Dublin a piece of architecture worthy of this still 
beautiful and historic street.’114 But he warned in one of several commentaries on the 
subject that ‘no worse fatality could befall O’Connell Street than the giving of unfettered 
powers to every owner to produce a design to suit himself.’115 Significantly, the Housing and 
Town Planning Act (1909) did not apply to Ireland. Therefore, the lord mayor sought new 
legislation to empower the Corporation to have some measure of control over the character 
of the buildings to be erected and to improve streets.  
The other major worry for the Corporation was financial. The loss in rates owing to 
the destruction was an estimated £16,000 in the 1916 financial year, a ruinous amount for a 
body struggling with a chronic housing problem.116 This loss would continue to accrue until 
the destroyed areas were rebuilt and reoccupied; the government was petitioned on the 
matter in September 1916.117 The Corporation sought financial assistance from the state to 
enable it to purchase ground areas for street widening and vacant sites on which owners 
were not in a position to rebuild. It also wished to provide financial aid to private owners 
over and above the ex gratia grant where the magnitude of compensation was insufficient 
to allow rebuilding in an improving architectural style or to meet elevated building costs.118 
Ultimately, the Corporation fared better on the financial side, with relatively generous 
provisions for the reinstatement of the destroyed area, than on the planning regulation 
aspect. From the outset both Samuel, who had been president of the local government 
board in England and possessed an interest in planning, and Chalmers appreciated the need 
for building regulation. The Dublin business community was less inclined to this view. 
 The Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association fiercely resisted any town planning 
regulations that might impinge on rebuilding or add to its cost. In an open letter to the 
press, at the end of May, it proposed four conditions for its acceptance of any such 
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restrictions. First, traders who wanted to return to business as quickly as possible should not 
be penalized by undue delay. Second, every trader in the ruined area should have the right 
to veto any architectural features unsuited to the requirements of his particular trade. 
Third, the cost of ‘mere beautification’ should be borne by the state or municipality. Fourth, 
compensation should be awarded if any improvement scheme reduced the frontage line of 
a trader’s property.119 This was buttressed by an editorial in the Independent the following 
day protesting against any requirement to ‘replace ordinary business premises by palatial 
structures.’120 By contrast an Irish Times’ editorial cautioned against a crude conflict 
between town planning and business interests, and counselled that traders should 
remember ‘that they owe something to the civic pride and national taste of the people 
among whom they earn their bread.’121 This initial intervention was an augury of the 
association’s prolonged dispute with the Corporation over the content of the Dublin 
Reconstruction (Emergency Provisions) bill.  
 In the immediate aftermath of the Rising, the energies of Lord Mayor Gallagher were 
focused on alleviating distress. He organized a fund to relieve distress, opened a section of 
the Mansion House for those who had been made homeless and distributed food and 
clothing. In an obituary comment in 1926, the Irish Times claimed that ‘by his tact and 
courage during that trying period’, the lord mayor, ‘won the good opinion of every section 
of the citizens.’122 On 17 May Gallagher had a meeting with Asquith and Chalmers in Dublin 
Castle, at which the prime minister expressed his desire to provide every necessary facility 
to the Corporation without delay. Chalmers invited the lord mayor to submit legislative 
proposals and the Dublin Reconstruction (Emergency Provisions) measure was furnished 
one week later.123 The first clause concerned street improvements and necessary alterations 
of previously enacted public health and housing acts. The second addressed various bye-
laws with respect to the structure, design and alignment of new buildings. The third 
proposed that ‘all expenses incurred or payable by the Corporation in the execution of this 
Act shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament.’ This proved the most 
contentious in the initial negotiations between the Corporation and the government. 
Chalmers and the solicitor-general met the lord mayor, town clerk and law agent on 25 May 
when a difference of opinion arose as to whether the measure should be a private one in 
the name of the Corporation or a government-sponsored bill.124 The Corporation insisted 
that the bill be considered by the prime minister and introduced by the government. 
Unsurprisingly, Chalmers was unable to recommend that expenses be defrayed by moneys 
provided by Westminster.125 As he put it to Bonham Carter, ‘My dread in this rebuilding has 
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been lest the Exchequer should be let in to pay the piper. My aim has been to saddle the 
Corporation with the cost of the tune which they may call.’126  
 The concerns of the Corporation were ventilated at two meetings with Samuel in 
Dublin Castle on 3 and 5 June.127 John Redmond and the Dublin M.P.s were present at the 
second consultation. The home secretary reassuringly acknowledged the deputation’s 
anxieties:   
Let me say at the outset that I entirely share your views that it would be a calamity if this devastation to 
a part of the City of Dublin were to result in unworthy buildings being erected spoiling your fine street 
… it would be greatly to be regretted if this opportunity were not seized to make Dublin even a finer city 
than it was before.
128
 
But he refused the request to make available a free Treasury grant. For its part the 
Corporation was unwilling to accept the suggestion that money be borrowed on the open 
market. Undeterred, Gallagher audaciously submitted that if the government was unwilling 
to provide a grant then it ought instead to provide a loan repayable over sixty years and free 
of interest for the first decade. The lord mayor informed Samuel that he had ‘not the least 
doubt that this suggestion represents the very minimum which public opinion in Dublin can 
be induced to accept as at all fair or equitable.’129 While the home secretary was keen that 
town planning should be put on a better footing, he shared his significant scruples about the 
terms of the loan with the chancellor of the exchequer.130 Given the exigencies of wartime 
retrenchment and the compensation of actual sufferers, the financial authorities flatly 
rebuffed the lord mayor’s proposition. In a stiff reply, the Corporation was informed that it 
could apply for a loan on ordinary terms at the end of the war.131 Repeated protests by 
Gallagher that Dublin Corporation would be granted legal powers without the financial 
resources to make them effective were not entertained.   
With the committed support of the I.P.P., and, in particular, J. J. Clancy, the party’s 
financial and local government expert, the doughty lord mayor appealed directly to the 
prime minister and home secretary in the House of Commons on 6 July.132 The deputation 
was introduced by Redmond, who was flanked by Joe Devlin and the Dublin M.P.s. In his 
reply, Asquith expressed his complete sympathy with the citizens of Dublin, considered that 
Dublin Corporation should have wider powers and promised to recommend a loan to the 
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chancellor of the exchequer. He instructed the Corporation to frame a financial scheme in 
conjunction with the local government board, which proved modest in both scope and 
budget when presented on 17 July.133 There was no place for grandiose suggestions of a 
new thoroughfare from the quays to Broadstone Terminus or the creation of a circus at 
Nelson’s Pillar. Instead, other than building controls, the Corporation proposed the 
widening of parts of Earl Street and Henry Street. At the insistence of Henry Robinson, the 
loan sought was capped at £750,000 instead of £1,000,000.134 The Treasury sought a 
number of safeguards. These were embodied in clause 3 of the Dublin Reconstruction 
(Emergency Provisions) bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons on 1 August. 
First, advances could not exceed the difference between the amount of compensation and 
the total cost of rebuilding. Second, they had to be made to property owners and secured 
by mortgage.135  
As the bill was being placed in the hands of the parliamentary draftsman, Samuel 
presciently warned Gallagher of the necessity of the measure being framed so as to prevent 
its active opposition by property owners.136 Should a conflict of view arise, delay in restoring 
the devastated areas would be inevitable. So it proved. Clause two of the bill, which 
conferred on the Corporation powers to make bye-laws in respect of structure, materials, 
design, alignment and general symmetry of new buildings in the damaged area, was 
opposed by the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association as an unnecessary burden.137 
Fearing that property owners would have to fund the difference between the ex gratia 
grant and the cost of the Corporation’s scheme, a special meeting on 4 August 1916 sought 
to petition parliament. The second reading on 17 August was carried overwhelmingly by 156 
votes to 5, despite the forceful criticism of T. M. Healy, who sought to have the bill 
submitted to a select committee.138 This motion was withdrawn when Henry Duke 
suggested that the legislation be reconsidered during the parliamentary recess.139 Fourteen 
weeks of negotiations between the Association and the Corporation followed. The 
municipality sought the advice of a team of Dublin architects and of Raymond Unwin, the 
pioneering English architect, town planner and adviser to the Local Government Board of 
England.140 
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That the revised bill was an agreed measure owed much to the ‘indefatigable 
exertions’ of Gallagher.141 A memorandum setting out agreed amendments between the 
Corporation and the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association was presented to Duke in 
late November. A warning by him on 1 December that the bill would not reach the statute 
book if there were further delays focused minds.142 Crucially by the time of the third reading 
on 18 December the Treasury had relaxed its opposition to some of the local taxation 
clauses.143 The original clause two was struck out. It was replaced by far less robust 
provisions, whereby the city architect, to whom plans for new or restored buildings had to 
be submitted, could require, in the public interest, ‘reasonable alterations’ in respect of 
external design, frontage lines and materials.144 These were open to contestation and an 
arbitration procedure was laid down in sub-clause four with owners appointing their own 
expert and the city architect acting for the Corporation. Compensation would be paid to 
owners for alteration to frontage lines.145 Property owners sought and won three 
protections. The first was that the valuation of buildings before the destruction should not 
be increased for a set period. During the third reading Clancy proposed a thirty-year term. 
Recognizing that the circumstances were exceptional and that there had been a valuation in 
1915, Duke amended the exemption to twelve years. The second demand was that rates be 
remitted in the first year after buildings were reconstructed. This was championed by all the 
Dublin M.P.s. The chief secretary agreed but limited the concession to rebuilt property 
alone. Lastly, it was agreed that excise licenses attached to some of the destroyed premises 
be preserved.146 The Dublin Reconstruction (Emergency Provisions) Act received the royal 
assent on 20 December, two days before parliament was prorogued.  Throughout December 
coverage of this important measure for the city of Dublin and the steady lobbying of the 
Dublin M.P.s was completely overshadowed by the fall of Asquith’s government, Lloyd 
George’s accession as prime minister, the new coalition and, in particular, the fateful 
announcement by Duke on 21 December of the release of Irish internees.  
VI 
The British government was appeasing and pragmatic in respect of the reconstruction of 
Dublin. The demand for a generous measure of compensation was granted with little 
resistance. Not to have done so would surely have inflamed public opinion. The scale of 
compensation – £1,844,390 in ex gratia grants and a £700,000 loan to Dublin Corporation – 
was substantial, particularly given wartime austerity. One could argue that such a figure was 
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trifling for a government which daily spent millions prosecuting the war. But in an Irish 
context the amount of compensation for a relatively small portion of Dublin and her citizens 
was significant. By way of comparison, Irish income tax yielded £1,480,000 in 1913-14 and 
£3,999,000 in the wartime conditions of 1915-16.147 The approach adopted by the Property 
Losses (Ireland) Committee in 1916 had three advantages over the compensation schemes 
for damage to property during the War of Independence and Civil War. Although ex gratia 
and not in recognition of any right to compensation, the Imperial Treasury bore the full cost 
of the grants with the government effectively acting like an insurer in each case. This benefit 
was recognized by the Irish Investors’ Guardian, a monthly trade journal. In its account of 
the annual meeting of Kapp & Peterson, the pipe manufacturer and tobacco merchant, it 
commented: ‘it was well the shareholders had the Government to fall back upon, as but for 
that fact their interests would have suffered very heavily indeed from the untoward events 
in Dublin last year.’148 By contrast, property damaged during the period 1919-23 was subject 
to the malicious injury code and the cost substantially borne by Irish ratepayers and a 
fledgling state crippled by debt. As in 1916 no consequential loss was permitted. Secondly, 
each of the interested parties – Dublin Corporation, the Dublin Fire and Property Losses 
Association and the government – recognized the necessity of promptitude. The vast bulk of 
small claims had been settled by October 1916 and all but a handful of larger claims by the 
end of 1917. Such speedy resolution was enabled by the assessment of cases on the same 
basis as insurance claims. The mechanism adopted under the malicious injury code and the 
Damage to Property (Compensation) Acts, 1923-6 was more cumbersome and protracted as 
it involved a legal hearing where claimants had to prove that a wrongful act had been 
committed.149 Lastly, the approach of the Property Losses Committee – to recommend 
payment of the sum which an insurance company would have allowed had the loss been 
fully covered by insurance – was an equitable one. This helps explains the relatively small 
number of complaints regarding the magnitude of grants awarded. Inevitably, there were 
some objections that the insurance value fell short of the replacement cost. For example, 
Hugh Moore & Alexander Ltd. was aggrieved at an award of £20,500 for the destruction of 
the Linenhall building, having claimed £32,752.150 That there was no right of appeal may 
have discouraged disgruntled claimants. Others may simply have been thankful, given the 
grim wartime financial climate, to get the full insurance value of their loss, whether 
substantial or minor. Research on compensation awarded after the Irish Civil War indicates 
that the amounts were meagre and only permitted reinstatement on a modest scale.151  
 The reconstruction of Sackville Street took time. One of the first buildings to be 
rebuilt was that of Corrigan and Wilson, printers of Sackville Place; they resumed business in 
                                                          
147
 Irish Independent, 19 Sept. 1916. 
148
 Irish Investors’ Guardian: banking & insurance review, xxiv, no. 11 (2 June 1917), p. 137.  
149
 See Gemma M. Clark, ‘The fiery campaign: New agenda and ancient enmities in the Irish Civil War – a study 
of arson in three Munster counties’, in Brian Griffin and Ellen McWilliams (eds), Irish studies in Britain: new 
perspectives on history and literature (Newcastle, 2010), p. 73. 
150
 Hugh Moore & Alexander Ltd. to Healy, 29 Mar. 1917 (N.A.I., C.S.O.R.P. 3/690/2 (1917), 24665). 
151
 Clark, ‘The fiery campaign’, p. 76. 
 23 
 
February 1917.152 But this was exceptional. Although a considerable number of designs for 
rebuilding were lodged with the city architect by spring 1917, the restoration of Sackville 
Street was greatly impeded by wartime shortages, of steel in particular, and high building 
prices. Many businesses erected temporary structures until the way was clear to begin 
rebuilding. In February 1918 the Irish Times reported that ‘recent fine weather seems to 
have given quite a powerful impetus to rebuilding work, and the central area of the city 
presents an air of activity such as it has hardly worn at any time since restoration was taken 
in hand.’153 The end of the First World War greatly accelerated the pace of reinstatement 
and unemployment in the building trade virtually disappeared.154 By mid-1920 the 
restoration of Sackville Street, so important for the commercial life of Dublin, was almost 
complete. Only a few ex gratia payments were outstanding due to legal difficulties, labour 
disputes or shortages of materials.155 This is confirmed in Thom’s directory 1921 which lists 
only a few businesses as ‘rebuilding’.156 One of those was the iconic Clery’s department 
store. Closely modelled on Selfridges of Oxford Street, London it opened on 9 August 1922, 
days after the Civil War hostilities saw parts of Sackville Street bombarded for the second 
time in the space of six years.157  
Unquestionably, the Dublin Reconstruction (Emergency Provisions) Act was an 
underwhelming measure. Critics pointed to its limited nature and lack of bold vision. The 
Irish Builder lamented as ‘a great opportunity missed’ the absence of a co-ordinated and 
unified architectural scheme for Sackville Street.158 Only part of the upper east side was 
built to any co-ordinated design as architects were allowed to take an individual approach, 
subject only to some provisions surrounding building materials and frontage lines.159  The 
legislation did, however, prevent absolute flouting of accepted town planning principles and 
permitted modest improvements in terms of alignment and street widening. The 
Corporation’s decision to prescribe the use of machine-made red brick with stone dressing 
on Sackville Street occasioned considerable criticism from property owners, architects and 
stone suppliers. The Irish Builder scorned it as a ‘vandalistic policy … sadly insensible of the 
real interests, the dignity and appearance of this ancient city in a unique and epoch-making 
opportunity.’160 Businesses, particularly banks, which desired stone-fronted façades were 
subsequently assured that they would be met half way.161 Architectural aesthetics aside, the 
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quality of the building stock was improved, though some of the quirkier pre-Rising buildings 
such as the Dublin Bread Company were lost. Ultimately, commercial priorities and financial 
realities took precedence.   
The financial skirmishes between the government, property owners and Dublin 
Corporation may not have produced a perfect answer to the associated issues of 
compensation and reconstruction but it did prove workable. The fundamental demand of 
the Dublin Fire and Property Losses Association and the Corporation that the state should 
shoulder its liability to the full was largely satisfied.  The government played a crucial 
enabling role but received little gratitude for its investment. It seems that for mollified 
property owners avoiding financial disaster was not really cause for celebration. The 
government’s intervention did not restore public confidence or purchase any meaningful 
political goodwill. Like the Christmas 1916 amnesty for internees, the compensation gesture 
could not arrest the steady transformation of Irish public opinion occasioned by the 
government’s ill-conceived responses to the Rising and the failure of Lloyd George’s attempt 
to arrive at an agreed solution of the Irish question. For Redmond and his party the public 
verdict was equally unforgiving. Neither the repudiation of the Lloyd George scheme and 
partition nor diligent work for the reconstruction of Dublin could prevent the I.P.P.’s political 
dénouement.162  
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